



The Christian doctrine of the Incamation is, at bottom, the claim that Jesus Christ
was God incamate. As traditionally understood, this does not mean that Jesus was
a specially appointed prophet or that he was adopted by God or even that he was
pre-existent and existentially unique. No, the doctrine of the Incamation is more
radical that any of that. Its claim is that the human being Jesus of Nazareth was and
is God.
Not surprisingly, Jesus' identity claims assumed divine prerogatives (i.e., having
the ability to forgive sin; being the Lord of the Sabbath; being God's unique Son
and the Son of Man of Daniel ?; asserting authority over the Torah)' Such assertions
implying that he stood in the place of God didn't go over well wide either the Jewish
.o**rrii.y in which Jesus hai lived or in the larger Hellenistic and Greek worlds'
Ho\l/ co,rli God be bom? How could the divine being literally walk the earth as a
human who ate, drank, and slept? The very idea was, to borrow a phrase used in a
similar context by the Apostle Paul in First Corinthians, 'a stumbling block to Jews
and foolishness to Gentiles'(1: 23 NRSV). Nevertheless, that is the doctrine that
became the received view in the traditional Christian Church'
This essay will consider the nature of this essential Christian doctrine, examine
a particularly thomy philosophical problem to which it gives rise, and discuss three
potential responses proposed by its defenders.
The doctrine
In the third century cE, the Christian Church expended its collective theological
energy comlng to terrns with the relationship of Jesus Christ to God the Father' It was
in the founh century that rhe focus switched to the humaniry of Christ. Orthodox
Christianity had always affirmed Jesus' physical realiry. Although some Gnostic sects
had taughr that Christ, while divine (indeed, becurse divine) was not physically
.*bodiJ, early church theologians as far back as at least the writer of the letters of
John (generally believed to have been written at the very end of the first century)
stressed that Jesus Christ had a physical body'
The meat of the doctrine of the Incamation can be found in dre Nicene Creed and


























We believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ,
the only Son of God,
etemally begotten of the Father,
God from God, Light from Light,
true God from true God,
begotten, not made,
of one Being with the Father.
Through him all things were made.
For us and for our salvation
he came down from heaven:
by the power of the Holy Spirit
he became incamate from the Virgin Mary,
and was made man.
The emphasis here is clearly on the divinity of Christ. During the early fourth centurythe christian church was divided over the narure of cfuist. Arius and his followers
argued that Jesus Christ was pre'existent but was not etemal; rather, the Son had beenGod's first creation. He was thought unique and in many ways u*,iy r,rp.rio, to oth.,
created entities, but he was not of the same substance * iod ,h. Furir.r. altho"githe vote was hotly contested, in 325 the bishops 
^t th" co.r.rJtf Ni."" expricitlyrejected Arianism and embraced the doctrine that the Son was not only pre-existentbut was also 'begotten not made', that is, consubstantial with the Father.
while the Nicene Creed made explicit Christ's divinity 
".rd "ss.rt.d his humaniryit wasn't until almost 130 years later that a more fully developed account of therelationship of Christ's humanity to his diviniry was hammered out at the Council
of chaceldon in 451. The key christological claim is that J.r* cn irt is ,fully God
and fullv human.'The humaniry that Christ exemplifies is like ours except that hisis not stained with sin. Importantly, this implies that while the incamate God is theWord made flesh, he is not simply the \Uord made flesh. fh. *ri.*.nt endorsed atthis council (known as the 'Chalcedonian Definition') irrrirt trr"t Crrrist not only had
a human body but a human 'rarional soul.' In other words, h. ;; not just the soulof God the son housed in a human body: he had a human mind as welt. Had he not
|1i5 conative and cognitive aspects of humanity, he wourd have not been ,fullynuman.
The chief philosophical objection
There are various objections that can be raised against the docrine of the Incamation.
s91e are epistemological. For example, it might be thought that even if the accounts
of the life of Christ in the Gospels are presumed to be 
".J.r.",., there is nothing there(or in any other records) that could justifr the claim that Christ is literally God. This
may or may not be a good objection to belief in the Incamation, but it will not be thesubject of our focus here. Instead, the objection that will occupy ,r, I 
-.r^pt ysical innature. In the most straighdorward of terms, it goes like this:
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It is a necessary tmrh drat God is omnipotent and omniscient. This tmth
stems from the very concept of God: no being that lacked these properries
would qualifr as divine. Furthermore, it is also a necessary truth that no
human being can have infinite knowledge and power; to be human is to be
finite. And now we can see why it is impossible for there to be a being who
is both fully divine and fully human. To be fully divine is ro meet all of those
conditions necessary for divinity. Such a person will then be omniporent,
and omniscient. To be fully human, on the other hand, requires a person ro
be limited in power and knowledge. so a person who is fully divine and fully
human will be an omnipotent, omniscient being who is limited in power
and knowledge. But that is a logically inconsisrent description. Therefore,
the doctrine of the Incamation is not even possibly true: it represenrs a
metaphysical impossibiliry.
Let's try to be a bit more formal in our presentation of the problem. The argument
intends to show
[C] It is not possible that Jesus Christ is fully God and fully human.
Heret a more explicit formulation of the argument:
1 Necessarily, 
"r,ythttg that is God 
(i.e., divine) is omnipotent. (premise)
Z Necessarily, anphing that is human is not omnipotent. (premise)
3 Suppose: It is possible that Jesus Christ is both divine and human. (supposition for
reductio)
It is possible that Jesus is both omnipotent and human. (from l, 3)
It is possible that Jesus is both omnipotent and not omnipotent. (ftoml,4)
But it is not possible that Jesus is both omnipotent and not omniporent.
(premise)
[C] Therefore, it is not possible that Jesus Christ is both divine and human.
Because the heart of this objection to the classical understanding of the Incamation
is a claim of logical inconsistency, lett dub the argument above the 'lnconsistency
Argument.' Acrually, what we have here is an instance of a more general argument
type. I've selected omnipotence to represent all those divine qualities that, on the face
of it, would seem to be inconsistent with essential human qualities.
Before trying to figure out how the defender of traditional Christology can best
respond, let's make sure we fully appreciate the argument. There are three premises
among its seven steps. The first fwo are alleged necessary tmths that derive from the
concepts of God and humanify, respectively. The rationale for them was discussed
above, and we will have reason to come back to them later. For now we can grant that
they have at least a ceftain prima facie plausibility. The only other genuine premise is



















not omnipotenr. The justification for this premise is none other than the Law of Non-
connadiction which says that nothing can be both tme and false. So if Jesus Christ is
fully God and fully human, and if being the former entails being omnipotent and being
the latter entails being not omnipotent, then traditional Christology is committed to
both the tmth and the falsity of the claim that Jesus Christ was omnipotent, and thus
to denying the Law of Non-contradiction.
The argument is logically valid, and so the other steps will be mre if our premises
are tme. There are, then, only three ways of rationally avoiding the conclusion: one of
the premises must go. Either something can fail to be omnipotent and yet be divine,
or something can be omnipotent and yet be human, or something can both have and
lack the same properfy. As we will see, the denial of each one of these premises lines
up with a traditional response to this Christological objection-
Denying step 1: the kenotic solution
premise of the Inconsistency Argument is that, necessarily, anything that
is omnipotent. The traditional concept of the Christian God includes the
concepr of a being who created the universe exnihilo, and whose power is unlimited.
To affirm these things would seem to be nothing other than to affrrm God's omnipo-
tence. So in denying the first step does the Christian also deny that God has unlimited
power? Not necessarily. Peter Geach (1977) famously argued that Christians should
give up the concept of omnipotence in favor of what he termed 'almightiness.' Being
'almighty'would entail that there could be nothing more powerful than God, even if
(for technical philosophical and theological reasons we don't have time to get into)
God is not omnipotent per se. However, giving up the ascription of omnipotence for
rhese reasors will not help with the Inconsistency Argument, as steps 1 and Z could
easily be recast with 'almighty' in place of omnipotence.
The grounds for a more robust denial of the first step of the lnconsistency Argument
can be found in the New Testament itself. The Apostle Paul, writing to the church at
Philippi, had this to say about the Incamation:
Let the same mind be in you that was in Christ Jesus,
Who, though he was in the form of God, did not regard equality with God as
something to be exploited,
But emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being bom in human likeness.
(Phil. 2: 5-7 NRSV) ).
The later kenotic ftadition (the name of which derives from the Greek word kenosis
which means 'emptying') interprets this text as claiming that, in some metaphysi-
cally serious way, the second person of the tinity gave up, or emptied himself of,
some aspects of his divinity in order to take on humanity. The implication is that
the point of the Incorrsistency Argument is recognized even here: in order to become
human, God the Son had to empty himself of those aspects of his divine nature that




















omniscience are prime candidates for what the Son surrendered, although there may
have been others as well. Therefore, the kenoticist will say, it's not uue that in order
to be God a being must be omnipotent because Jesus Cfuist was both fully God and
fully human. Not only do we have a possible counterexample 
- 
we have an actual one!
(See Feenstra 1989 for a robust defense of kenoticism.)
The problem with this approach is that it appears to gut our concept of God. That
is, step 1 is grounded in a widespread and plausible account of the divine nature.
According to this view, what it is to be God is to be a being with attributes such as
omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, etc. The worry with the kenotic account
of the Incamation is that in divesting himself of divine properties like omnipotence
and omniscience, God the Son thereby ceases to be God. For in order for kenoticism
to be of help to the Christological raditionalist, it must not imply that God the Son
gave up dlinity in order to take on humanity.
Notice also that the problem for the Chalcedonian isn't just that omnipotence
is apparently inconsistent with genuine humanity, but that so many of the other
attributes are too. God is not only all-powerful, but omniscient' necessarily good,
etemal, etc. So even if it were possible for a divine being to give up some of his infinite
atrributes, how could it be that God the Son emptied himself of all of these qualities
and yet remained &vhv?. It is tempting to understand the kenotic position as implying
that the Son gave up his diviniry to become human. If the kenoticist insists that the
Son's diviniry was maintained while many of its distinctive atuibutes were given up,
she will rhen owe us an account of divinity on which it is possible that God is not
omnipotent, omniscient, necessarily good, etemal, etc. (See Senor 1991 for a proposal
along these lines.)
Thomy though the aforementioned problem is, it does not represent the most
serious objection to the kenotic solution. As noted above, the grounds for kenoticism
would seem to be a tacit recognition of the philosophical problem made explicit in the
Inconsistency Argument in order to become human, God the Son had to abandon
(at least temporarily) those qualities of divinity that are inconsistent with his human
incamation. Once the Son is suitably emptied, there is no barrier to taking on a human
nature. This method of getting around the lnconsistency Argument will work as long
as (a) giving up paradigmatic divine qualities is consistent with remaining divine and
(b) all the divine qualities that are inconsistent with human nature can be set aside.
The first objection we discussed concems (a). Ve are now sefting our sighs on (b).
As we begin to consider (b), note that there is nothing inherently mysterious in
the idea of property divestment. You have the ability to divest yourself of some of
your cunent qualities. Suppose you are a married professor of philosophy who lives
in New York Ciry. Get divorced, quit your job, and move to Texas and you'll have
changed some of your rather important properties. But you've got other propefties
that you aren't in a position to do arrything about (e.g., having been bom in the
rwenrieth century). Call properties of this latter sort 'stable propefties.' The kenotic
srraregy depends on the non-stabiliry of all the divine properties that are inconsistent
with humanity. For if any of those attributes tum out to be stable, then there will be

















































































instance is all the Inconsistency Argument needs to show the logical incoherence of
the doctrine of the Incamation.
There are, it would seem, any number of stable divine properties that are appar-
ently inconsistent with human nature. For example, on standard theism, God is the
uncreated, necessarily existing creator of all that is other than himself. Yet these
qualities, one and al[, are both stable and yet apparently inconsistent with a personb
having a human nature. Since the kenotic approach leaves us with a human being
who is the uncreated, necessarily existing creator of all that is other than himseli
one may be excused for thinking that rather little ground has been made against the
Inconsistency Argument.
So even if kenoticism can provide grounds for denying step 1 of this particular
version of the Inconsistency Argument, it is far from clear that it is a successful
strategy for dealing with all such arguments.
Denying step 2: Thomas Morris's 'two minds' reply
Since there will be instances of the Inconsistency Argument that have an unassailable
frrst premise, we must look elsewhere if we are to defend onhodox Christology.
\Torking through the argument's steps in order, let us now consider step 2. !?hat is our
ground for thinking that, necessarily, all human beings lack omniporence?
We might think that the answer to this is rather simple and directly parallel to what
we had to say earlier about the divine qualities: it is part of our concept of humaniry
that humans are finite creatures with fairly limited capacities. We are of a rather small
size even when measured by terrestrial standards, and our powers are thus circum-
scribed by what a being weighing at most a few hundred pounds is capable of. So in
the same way that our concept of divinity necessitates that only an omnipotent being
counts as divine, our concept of humaniry requires that only a being with limited
powers (and who thus lacks omnipotence) could be human.
Thomas Morris (1986) has challenged this claim about the concept of humaniry
(Richard Swinbume 1994 gives a similar defense). Making a distinction berween
cluster concepts and natural kind concepts, Morris argues that it is only the former
whose essence can be known by simple a priori reflection and which will consist of
other concepts knowable by reflection. So, for example, our concept of a bachelor is a
cluster concept par excellence. By reflection, we can come to know that no one who
is married can be a bachelor. However, we do not find out the essence of a natural
kind in the same way. Thke, for example, our concept of an orange. We might think
we could say that an orange is a sweet, orange-colored fruit with a peel. While this
is a fair description of a standard orange, we must acknowledge that drose of us who
are not horticulturists lack the expertise to say that these are necessary conditions of
something's falling under the botanical kind orange. That is, we could possibly leam
that there are types oforanges that are green and sour when ripe. Ifour concept ofan
orange were a cluster concept, we'd be in a position to tell the horticulturists, 'No, you
apparently don't understand what an orange is: nothing that is green when ripe could
possibly be an orange.' But we are not in a position to say that. Being an orange is to
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be a member of a certain natural kind, and the essences of natural kinds are discovered
by empirical investigation rather than conceptual reflection.
What does all this have to do with the Incamation? Morris thlnks that once we
understand that our notion of humanity is a natural kind rather than a cluster concept,
we will see that many of the convictions we might have about the essence of humanity
may, in principle, be overridden in the same way that our conviction that being
orange when ripe may be shown to be wrong by botany. Just as being orange in color
might be very coTrvrwn amongst oranges even if it is not essential for being an orange,
so the objector to the lnconsistency Argument can say that while lacking omnipo-
tence might be extremely corvnon among humans, it is not an usmtial property of
humanity.
Whereas the first response to the Inconsistency Argument held fast to the standard
human kind properties, and gave ground on the Son's divine attributes, the current
reply does just the reverse. To be fully human, in this sense, is to have a properly
functioning human body and mind. Precisely what that consists in will be determined
by a complete science of the human person, and not by a priori reflection on our non-
scientifi.c concept of humaniry. What we currently know of the humankind nature
might not obviously preclude the possibiliry of that nature's becoming intimately
associated with a divine nature and all that that involves.
So far we've said nothing about the 'Two Minds' aspect of Morris's position. There
are two reasons for appealing to the dualiry of minds. First, the New Testament contains
passages which seem to suggest, for example, that there are things Jesus Christ does not
know (see Matthew 24:36). The second reason for insisting on the Two Minds view
is that without it, the defender of orthodoxy may seem to have won the batde but lost
the war. By dropping all the relevant features of humanity that were incompatible with
the standard divine propefties, the Christian is in danger of being left with a picture of
Jesus Christ as perhaps technically human but rather little like us.
What makes Morris's Two Minds view distinct from just any orthodox position (as
we've seen, the Chalcedonian definition insists that Jesus Christ had both human
body and rational soul in addition to the mind of God the Son) is its insistence that
during the Son's time on earth, it was the human mind that was primarily that through
which God incamate consciously operated. T[king on and functioning through the
consciousness of a human mind can explain how Christ could be both ignorant of
some things and yet omniscient: the ignorance is a function of the conscious human
mind while omniscience is had in the divine mind. Furtherrnore, we can suppose that
the human mind came to know most things in much the same way that any typical
human mind would come ro know them. We needn't think of the infant Christ
consciously pondering the thoughts of the Godhead if it is the human mind that was
the primary vehicle in which conscious thought occurred.
The main problem for the Two Minds view is squaring it with the Chalcedonian
Definition's insistence that there is but a single person in the Incamation. Morris
himself sees this difficulry and attempts to make plausible his claim that two minds
can be had by a single person. Yet as John Hick (1989) points out' there is a dilemma














































































mind has access to the divine mind only inasmuch as the divine mind allows it to have
(which is Morris's view), then it would seem that the relationship between the mind of
God the Son and the human mind of Christ is in principle no different from God the
Son's relationship with any other human mind. None of us (including Jesus Chrisr)
has r-uuestricted access to God the Son's mind; all of us (including Jesus Christ) know
just as much of the divine mind as the divine mind chooses to reveal. Morris sees this
pan of the dilemma as a potential problem and tries to solve it by maintaining that
the human and divine minds of God incamate have a single, shared set of cogniave
ard causal powerc. The distinction in the two minds is in their accompanying belief
systerns, and not in the faculties that produce (or are associated with) them. But if
we say there is but one set of causal and cognitive powers, and that *rese powers are
the cognitive and causal powers of God the Son, then it is highly questionable if a
genuine human mind, or'rational soul,'has been taken on at all. So the dilemma is
this: either there are two distinct sets of cognitive and causal powers, or there are not.
If there are, rhen the uniry of the lncamation is threatened (and the heresy known as
Nestorianism looms), and there is apparently, in principle, no unique relation between
the human mind of Christ and the mind of God the Son. If there are not two distinct
sets of powers, then it is hard to see that God incamate had a genuine human mind
(and the heresy known as Apollinarianism looms).
One final point in deferue of the Two Minds view: it is clear that orthodoxy insists
that God the Son took on a complete human nature and that includes taking on a
complete human mind or'rational soul.' So Morris might claim that, to some degree
at least. all defenders of the Chalcedon Defrnition will have to face Hick's dilemma.
Denying step 6: The compositional model
The final premise of the argument comes at step 6, and it asserts that it is not possible
that Jesus Christ be both oflrnipotent and not omnipotent. As claimed above, this
is really glounded in what might just be the single most important rule of logic and
of rational thoughtr the Law of Non-connadiction. How, one might reasonably ask,
could the believer deny something so basic?
The key, the defender of orthodoxy will say, is that one can af6rm the Law of Non-
connadiction and yet deny step 6. For Jesus Christ differs from the rest of humanity
in one very important respect: he has two natures, one divine and one human. So
property ascriptions to him are ambiguous in a way that properry ascriptions to the
rest of us aren't. When we say that Jesus is omnipotent, what we are really asserting
is that Jesus Christ, qua divine nature, is omnipotent. And when we say that Jesus
Christ lacks omnipotence, what we are asserting is that Jesus Christ, qua human, lacks
omnipotence. Had Chrlst a single nature, then the claim that he is both omnipotent
and not omnipotent would violate the Law of Non-contradiction. But as it is, there is
no contradiction in saying that, qua his divine nature Christ is omnipotent and qua
his human nature he is not.
Eleonore Stump (2004) and Brian Leftow (2004) offer independent, although
strikingly similar accounts of the metaphysics of the Incamation that they find in
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the writings of Thomas Aquinas. The firndamental idea is that God incamate is a
compositional entity composed of God the Son and the human body and mind of
Jesus Christ. On this account, the properties that God incamate has qua diviniry are
properties that are had by his divine part; similarly, his human properties are had by his
human pan. This approach puts some flesh on the bones of the qua claim above. The
apparent inconsistency is resolved by assigning the properties in question to distinct
parts of God incamate. Just as there are no logical difficulties in saying of an apple
that it is red qua its skin and not red qua its core, so there is no logical problem with
the claim that Jesus Christ is omnipotent qua his divine part and not omnipotent qua
his human part.
The difficulty with this view can be seen if we keep squarely in mind that the
doctrine asserts that although there are two natures, there is but one person and hence
a single subject of predication. So even if we grant that the divine part is omnipotent
and the human part is not omnipotent, we must ask if the compositional God incamate
is omnipotent. If we say that having an omnipotent paft, God incamate himself is
omnipotent, then we would seem to be right back where we started: Jesus Christ (who
is God incamate) is a human who is yet omnipotent. But if we go the other way and
say that the human part tmmps the divine part where omnipotence is concemed, and
hence that God incamate is not omnipotent, then we have a divine being who is not
omnipotent. So one might be excused for wondering how the compositional account
cuts ice against t}re lnconsistency Argument. For in the final analysis, it doesn't
seem to offer us a way of seeing how Jesus Christ could be both omrripotent and not
omnipotent; instead, it shows only how he could have an omnipotent part and a non-
omnipotent paft. But these rhings were never in doubt. No one ever thought that,
say, his left eye brow was omnipotent. And the Christological raditionalist has always
claimed that he was omnipotent in his divine nature. The point ar issue is whether
the person who is God incamate can be said to be omnipotent, nor whether he has an
omnipotent part.
There is another dfficulry inherent in the compositional picrure. Onhodoxy is
clear that there is only a single person in the Incamation. The person who is God
the Son and the person who is Jesus Christ are the same person. However, the friend
of the compositional picture cannor asseft rhis. For God the Son is, on the compo-
sitional view, but a proper part of the whole that is God incamate. The conclusion
must be either that God incamate is a person too, and so there are rwo persons in
the Incamation (but this is the heresy of Nestorianism pure and simple), or God
incamate has a person as a paft (i.e., God the Son) but is not a person himself. But
then Jesus Christ, who the tradition tells us just is God incamate, is an impersonal
conglomerate witl a personal paft. Yet surely this is not theologically acceptable to
the Chalcedonian tradition that claims that the rwo natures are joined in such a way
that they are 'concurring in one Person' and that the incamate God, Jesus Christ, is
'in all things like unto us.'The compositional view would seem to have trouble with
both of these claims: the God incamate has a person as a part but is not a person, and














































































In a bdef essay such as this, it is not possible to explore the philosophical difficulties
and attempted solutions in anything like the detail they deserve. Nor is it possible to
so much as mention all the issues that should have a hearing. What can be said by
way conclusion is simply this: what the doctrine of the Incamation proposes is deeply
mysterious, and while a good prima facie case can be made for its being logically
inconsistent, the defender of the tradition is not without resources in attempting to
cast doubt on the Inconsistency Argument.
See a]so Christianity (Chapter 6), Religious pluralism (Chapter 20), Inclusivism and
exclusivism (Chapter 21), Omniscience (Chapter 24), Omnipotence (Chapter 25),
Creation and divine action (Chapter 30), The Tiinity (Chapter 49), Revelation
(Chapter 50), Resurrection (Chapter 52), Sin and salvation (Chapter 53), Miracles
(Chapter 55).
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